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1 Introduction
The relationship between institutions and inequality is a classical theme in sociology. The historical
transformations leading to the emergence of market structures in formerly socialistic economies pro-
vided interesting cases to study how institutional change affects the distribution of wealth and power
(Nee, 1989; Róna-Tas, 1994; Szelényi&Kostello, 1996). The scientific debate on inequality in reforming-
and post- socialist societies has centered on the transitionmechanism, aiming at identifying those actors
who emerge as winners out of the institutional change. State socialism is considered as an institutional
arrangement inwhich the integration— inPolanyian terms—of state, economy, and society is achieved
bymeans of a wide redistribution of resources (Nee&Matthews, 1996; Szelényi, Beckett &King, 1994).
Accordingly, in a socialistic “redistributive” economy privileges accrue to a few so-called redistributors.
These redistributors can be those who directly control the production means formally owned by the
state, i.e., mainly, high ranking officers (Bian, Breiger, Davis, & Galaskiewicz, 2005), or more gener-
ally those who endorse and legitimize the redistributive mechanism, such as prominent Party members,
loyalists, technocrats and intellectuals (Djilas, 1957; King & Szelényi, 2005; Konràd & Szelényi, 1979;
Szelényi, 1982). Under the socialist model of state ownership and “rational redistribution,” Party orga-
nization has a high degree of penetration in organizational structures, education and work institutions.
Accordingly, Party membership, the most common political credential, can interfere with occupational
allocation (Moore, 1987; Connor, 1979; Djilas, 1957; Kalleberg, 1988; Parkin, 1971; Szelényi, Beckett &
King, 1994; Walder, 1985 & 1986). Thus, the main question addressed in this debate is whether a change
in the resource allocation system, from central redistribution towards market, favors entrepreneurs at
expense of the redistributors (Bian, 2002; Bian & Logan, 1996; Cao & Nee, 2000; Gerber, 2002; Nee,
1989 & 1991; Nee & Matthews, 1996; Róna-Tas, 1994; Szelényi & Kostello, 1996; Walder, 2003, 2002,
1996 & 1995; Walder &Nguyen, 2008). In so doing, scholars focus on the effects of political credentials
in upward mobility paths during the transition.
Institutional changes occurring in reforming- and post- socialist societies also raised questions on
the value of social resources under different institutional arrangements. Thus, the extensive research
program on social capital effects in status attainment processes includes also studies on social network
use carried out in reforming- and post- socialist societies.
The market transition debate largely overlooks the Cuban case. In part, this is due to the lack of
individual-level data on inequality in Cuba. On the other hand, Cubanologists tend to focus exclusively
onCuba (Morris, 2014), neglecting literature and debates on reforming- and post-socialist societies. The
present article is innovative because it discusses the Cuban case in the light of the market transition
debate and uses data from a survey in Cuba. In particular, this study empirically explores the factors
associated to becoming a cuentapropista, namely a self-employed worker in the emerging private sector.
Data were collected shortly before the launch of the more recent reforms plan that revitalized market-
oriented reforms of the 1990s. In particular, the data collection was conducted immediately before the
VI Party Congress held on April 2011 that followed the discussion of the precongressional document
Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social (theGuidelines of Economic and Social Policy). The bulk
of empirical research on social structures transformations in Cuba uses data collected during the 1990s.
Accordingly, the present study contributes to fill a gap in the empirical research and could be used as a
benchmark for further researches investigating the consequences of the recent liberalizations in Cuba.
The essay is structured as follows. The first section provides a short description of Cuban reforms
in the 1990s, and the consequent emergence of cuentapropismo. The second section summarizes the
relevant empirical literature on political credential rewards and network effects in reforming and post
socialist societies. The third section presents the theory and hypotheses that were tested. The fourth
section describes the sampling design and data in detail. The fifth section presents the main findings of
the empirical analysis. The concluding section also discusses some implications of research results and
their generalization.
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2 The Emergence of Cuentapropismo
The external shock of the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) pro-
voked a sudden economic crisis in Cuba. The crisis, exacerbated by the US government’s sanctions and
the internal inefficiency of centralized Cuban economic system, hit rock bottom in 1993. The subse-
quent rapid deterioration of the social conditions of the Cubans prompted the government to imple-
ment a set of market-oriented reforms in order to reintegrate Cuba into the capitalist world economy
(Eckstein, 2010).
Between 1990 and 1994, the most remarkable changes included: 1) the partial opening of the Cuban
economy to foreign investments, particularly in two sectors: tourism andmining; 2) the partial dollariza-
tion of specific segments of the economy, leading tomonetary duality (which followed the spontaneous
process of partial dollarization in transactions among the population); 3) the creation of agricultural
production cooperatives; 4) the legalization of self-employment under the Cubanmoniker “trabajo por
cuenta propia” (e.g. bed and breakfast, small restaurants, cafeterias, watchmakers, craftsmen, barbers,
etc.).
The reforms implemented inCuba since the 1990s are documented in details elsewhere (Domínguez,
2004; Domínguez, Pérez-Villaneuva, & Barberia, 2004; Domínguez, Pérez-Villaneuva, Espina-Prieto,
& Barberia, 2012). Due to the scope of this essay, however, reform that legalized the trabajo por cuenta
propia needs to be addressed providing some more details.
Trabajo por cuenta propia was strongly reduced during the so-called “Revolutionary Offensive” of
1968. It was the Decree Law 141 of September 1993 that expanded the list of jobs that could be carried
out by self-employed workers, the so-called cuentapropistas. The Cuban government approved the ex-
pansion of trabajo por cuenta propia in order to: i) incorporate a part of the widespread informal econ-
omy into the formal economy; ii) boost production; iii) give some employment chances to a few dis-
advantaged categories (i.e. workers laid off of state-enterprises which downsized, retirees1, housewives).
Self-employment has been legalized only for low-tech activities that do not require a high level of ed-
ucation or professional skills. Also for this reason, the Decree Law 141 specifically excluded university
graduates as applicants for obtaining licenses to develop business. The Cuban government established
a set of formal restrictions2 and control mechanisms to prevent skilled technicians or professionals (e.g.,
doctors and other health workers, professors and teachers) from traditional sectors from migrating to-
wards more gainful jobs. This is because, in Cuba, where state-salaries have not risen in real terms in
line with the living cost, on the contrary the cuentapropismo sector generally offers remunerative jobs
(Espina-Prieto, 2012; Ferriol-Muruaga, Quintana & Pérez, 1999).
The legalization of self-employment was conceived as a tactical measure undertaken to confront
consequences of the sudden economic crisis, instead of a structurally reform of the Cuban economy.
In fact, the enactment of reforms aiming at the expansion of the non-state sector was characterized by
a stop-&-go trend for the following two decades3 (Hernández & Domínguez, 2015). Nevertheless, the
crisis and subsequent reforms changed the Cuban socio-economic structure. The services and primary
sectors grew, while the secondary sectors decayed (Espina-Prieto & Togores-González, 2012), but above
all new so-called “emerging sectors,” including cuentapropismo, appeared. In the literature on Cuba, the
term “emerging sectors” is used to refer to that part of the Cuban economy in which the amount of
workers or transactions expanded as a consequence of the market-oriented reforms of the 1990s. In par-
ticular, the classification emerging vs traditional sectors conventionally distinguishes between activities
in which new types of incentive have been applied, such as material or monetary advantages for work-
ers linked to exports or to the domestic dollar market (“emerging”), and those which remain governed
by incentives and leadership criteria applied prior to the crisis (“traditional”) (cfr. Espina-Prieto, 2001,
1. Like state-salaries, purchasing power of pensions also dropped in real terms because of the crisis. Living standards of retirees
worsened also due to deterioration of the state-welfare provision.
2. These restrictions were just partly smoothed in the recent years. For example, professionals were allowed to apply for
licenses since 2010 but only with permission from their work centers and in activities outside their areas of expertise (Ritter
& Henken, 2014).
3. On the contrary, the most recent measures undertaken after the approval of the Guidelines of Economic and Social Policy
are presented as permanent adjustments for updating the Cuban socialist model.
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p. 32; Barbería, 2008, p. 21). Emerging sectors aremainly composed ofmixed andCuban companies that
developed in relation to the tourism industry and/or the domestic markets for goods in hard currency;
some firms also emerged in the export of high value-added products (e.g., the pharmaceutical industry).
Cuentapropismo—and in particular small private businesses operating in hard currency as they provide
higher incomewith respect to state-salaries (Espina-Prieto, 2012; Ferriol-Muruaga et al., 1999)—belongs
to the emergent sector, too.
As a consequence of the mentioned changes in the socio-economic structures, a process of social
re-stratification occurred (Espina-Prieto, 2004) and inequality started to grow (Romanò, 2012; Ranis &
Kosak, 2004; Mesa-Lago, 2004). Despite the lack of individual-level data released by the Cuban author-
ities, studies on inequality carried out in Cuba show that self-employed workers generally have higher
living standard and incomes than state-workers employed in traditional sectors (e.g. Ritter & Henken,
2014; Espina-Prieto, 2010; Espina-Prieto & Togores-González, 2012; Zabala, 2010; Henken, 2002; Cor-
rales, 2004). Accordingly, Cubans consider becoming a cuentapropista as a path of upward mobility
(Espina-Prieto & Togores-González, 2012).
In the evolving socio-economic structure briefly described above, the control of specific resources
(e.g., human, economic, political and social capital) enabled some individuals to become self-employed
workers, while others who lacked such control remained stuck in traditional sectors. The research ques-
tion underlying this article is whether political credentials andmobilization of strong ties (social capital)
predict becoming a cuentapropista. As seen in the previous section, both factors are amply studied in the
market transition debate. In the literature on the Cuban case, they instead remain poorly documented.
Concerning the economic capital, the essay explores whether recipients of remittances aremore likely to
run profitable small business.
3 Theoretical Background
Party affiliation is generally a prerequisite to get a job as administrator, manager in state-owned enter-
prises or bureaucrat until the Party maintains control over economic activities. Conversely, there is no
evidence that other workers are systematically screened for political credentials. The relationship be-
tween Party affiliation and the private sector is usually negative under state socialism. In fact, there is
evidence that, in state socialism, Party members tend to not enter into private sector (Szelényi, 1987).
On the contrary, findings frompost socialist east European countries suggest that being a Partymem-
ber (or ex Party member) is an advantage to obtain desirable occupations in the private sector after the
political turn (Róna-Tas, 1994; Staniszkis, 1991). Nee (1991) finds similar results also in rural China dur-
ing the reforming socialism era. Three different arguments can account for the Party membership’s
advantages in the attainment of desirable occupations during the transition. First, Party membership
provides individuals with opportunities to expand their personal networks. Party members participate
in meetings to discuss political and economic guidelines at the local or national level (according to own
position). Thus, in comparisonwith non-members, Partymembers aremore likely to learn information
about changes through the exploitation of a wide network of connections based on (prior) Party orga-
nization. Obtaining reliable information is a precious resource for career opportunities (Granovetter,
1973), even more so under circumstances of institutional change, because information on reforms tends
to be scarce and fragmented. In addition, as the Party is a hierarchical organization, its members have ac-
cess to higher status contacts in terms of bureaucratic power and influence. Both the resources— access
to information along higher status contacts — can represent the key factors to account for advantages
enjoyed by Party members in the attainment of desirable positions also after the political turn. Second,
according to their level, Party members can find remunerative occupations in more dynamic sectors by
virtue of their previously acquired expertise (Róna-Tas, 1994). This second argument relies on the evi-
dence supporting the so-called “socialist ideology hypothesis.” This hypothesis posits that social reforms
implemented in socialist states are effective in reducing class inheritance on educational attainment on
the one hand, and in strengthening the link between occupational attainment and educational creden-
tials on the other hand (Grusky &Hauser, 1984; Yaish & Andersen, 2012; Krymkowski, 1991; Sieben &
De Graaf, 2001; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992). Accordingly, in the second stage of socialism transition
the relationship between Party membership and higher status-occupations attainment becomes spuri-
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ous: higher education is the main predictor of both occupations and Party affiliation (Szelényi, 1982;
Konrad & Szelényi, 1979). Third, Party members, especially if in position of power, can commodify
their bureaucratic privileges to create new income opportunities for themselves (or their families or as-
sociates) outside the planned economy (cf. Staniszkis, 1991).
Some studies also find that business ownership in post-communist countries is linked both directly
and indirectly to pre-communist property ownership. In some countries, such asHungary andBulgaria,
the enforcement of policies aimed at the restoration of pre-communist property rights accounts for this
continuity between the pre- and post-communist period with respect to property ownership (direct
link) (Szelényi&Kostello, 1998; Hanley&Treiman, 2004). Besides the direct link,Hanley andTreiman
find that:
Pre-communist family property ownership also led indirectly to post-communist en-
trepreneurship, by increasing the odds of attaining élite positions, which provided an
important springboard for entrepreneurship after the collapse of communism (2004, p. 4).
Although various studies on transitional economies focus on the relationship between Party mem-
bership and entry in the private sector, this issue remains empirically unexplored in the studies on Cuba.
More generally, social mobility study is traditionally lacking in Cuba. Yet, the idea that the Cuban Com-
munist Partymaintains political consensus by rewarding its ownmembers can be foundboth in popular
belief and in some studies (e.g. Corrales, 2004).
The impact of social networkmobilization in the status attainment process is amply documented in
western societies. A growing collection of researches from China and Russia find similar results (Bian,
2002; Bian et al., 2005; Bian & Ang, 1997; Gerber &Mayorova, 2010; Huang, 2008; Yakubovich, 2006;
Róna-Tas, 1994). For example, in China, as in western capitalist societies, personal networks facilitate all
three aspects of occupational process: entry into the labor force, inter-firmmobility and re-employment
after being laid off (Bian, 2002). Initial research findings fromCuba also suggest that turning to personal
contacts to successfully obtain a desirable job is a common practice (Echevarría-León, 2008; Espina Pri-
eto&Togores-González, 2012; Echevarría-León&Díaz, 2014; Echevarría-León, Diaz, &Romero, 2014).
The Center for Psychological and Sociological Studies (CIPS, hereafter) carried out a qualitative study
based on 111 in-depth interviews to explore the key factors favoring (or disfavoring) upward mobility
paths in Cuba. According to the subjects interviewed, the decisive prerequisites for being employed in
emerging sectors combine high qualifications with personal networks providing information about job
opportunities and personal recommendations, which in turn facilitate the attainment of desirable jobs
(Espina-Prieto & Togores-González, 2012, p. 278).
However, studies on the impact of social capital on upward mobility carried out in capitalist soci-
eties indicate that an individual who mobilizes weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) — that is, acquaintances
— and high-status contacts (Lin, 1999 & 2002) to conduct his or her job search has a better chance of
obtaining desirable occupations.4 In comparison with strong ties, weak ties are probable bridges that
link an individual to other social circles, thereby accessing useful information unlikely to be available
in his or her own circle. Thus, weak ties represent useful instruments to obtain otherwise unattainable
information. Furthermore, as individuals tend to frequently interact and associate with similar others
in terms of lifestyles and socio-economic characteristics, weak ties are more likely to reach higher status
people. An applicant for a job should benefit from accessing people higher up in the social hierarchy
because these are more able to exert favorable influence (Lin, 1999). In contrast with what occurs in
capitalist societies, however, initial results from China suggest that strong ties provide the most valu-
able resources in facilitating occupational attainment. This is so because in socialist societies strong ties
4. Granovetter’s (1973) prominent study on the strength of weak ties generated a wide research program focused on the role of
social capital on social status attainment in western industrialized countries. The scientific debate has centered on which
type of ties (weak or strong) affects individual occupational status (e.g. entry in the labor market, occupational career, and
reemployment). Empirically, support for strength of weak ties theory was found by various studies: Granovetter (1973) in
United States; Van Hoye, van Hooft, & Lievens (2009) in Belgium; Brady (2015) in Ireland. However, other studies found
support for the strength of strong ties: Ericksen & Yancey (1977); Grieco (1987) in UK; Barbieri (1997) in Italy. There is
increasing consensus that the importance of the strength of ties varies depending on individual socio-economic level. For
example, weak ties favor the obtaining of profitable high-skilled occupations, whereas strong ties matter for manual and
low-level occupations (Kramarz & Skans, 2014; Granovetter, 1983; Piselli, 2001).
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secure influence from authorities, an asset that is more difficult to obtain than just information (Bian,
2002). This hypothesis elaborated by Bian is commonly known as “strength of strong ties theory.” The
strength of strong ties hypothesis is consistent with those claims suggesting that the effectiveness of the
weak ties rather than strong ties on the successful job attainment depends on the labor market institu-
tions. Weak ties favor the attainment of profitable jobs if labor market institutions are fully developed
(Barbieri, 1997). Under these circumstances, novel information is a key resource for successfully complet-
ing the job search. However, in socialist societies labor demand and supply are not regulated by market
principles. On the contrary, labor supply is controlled through policies and institutional agencies and
individuals are obliged to sell their labor (Szelenyi et al., 1994). Consequently, influence from authorities
is a more valuable resource than just information, in order to obtain a desirable job.
4 Theory andHypotheses
4.1 ResearchQuestion andHypotheses
Scholars tend to agree that the impact of political credentials on entry in the private sector depends on
the pace and nature of reforms through which the market emerges. In particular, Party members begin
to penetrate the private sector only after the market comes to be legitimated, or at least tolerated, as a
principle of economic integration. Accordingly, the different socioeconomic and political circumstances
in which the reforms take place should not be overlooked (Szelényi & Kostello, 1996; Walder, 1996;
Gerber, 2002; Nee, 1991). Thus, in this paragraph, I will discuss the Cuban case in the light of research
findings from reforming- and post- socialist societies reviewed in the previous paragraph. Then, I will
present the hypotheses on the relationship between entry in the private sector and Party affiliation and
use of strong ties.
Themarket-oriented reforms undertook by the Cuban government since the 1990s are certainly pro-
found in the light of Cuba’s revolutionary past. Nonetheless, they are timid when compared with those
occurred elsewhere (e.g., in Eastern Europe and China). In Cuba, reforms concern some liberalizations
in selected economic sectors and exclude any form of large-scale privatization processes. For this reason,
state-employees, even though they dropped in comparison with 1989, at the moment of the data collec-
tion still accounted for 83% of the workers. The Cuban government prompted these market-oriented
reforms to confront the sudden economic crisis caused by the external shock of the Soviet Bloc dissolu-
tion, and insisted on presenting them as a necessary evil. Accordingly, the reforms were never part of
a coherent radical reform plan, but rather just a series of moderate institutional changes, often incon-
sistent and anyway intended to be reversed as soon as possible (Font, 2009). Thus, for example, since
the early 2000s the Cuban authorities enacted a series of adjustments in order to mitigate some of the
effects of the earlier liberalizations. These adjustments, among other elements, pursued a decrease in
the number and weight of mixed companies and small private businesses created during the 1990s. As
a result, the mechanism of centralized redistribution has maintained its prominent role, despite the re-
forms. Moreover, official discourses and statements on the trabajo por cuenta propia have constantly
been ambivalent. Cuentapropismo, even in its legal forms, is typically portrayed as a gray area, funda-
mentally alien to the Cuban model. Only after the approval of the Guidelines of Economic and Social
Policy the Cuban authorities began to present the trabajo por cuenta propia and other sectors stemming
frommarket oriented reforms as structurally complementary to the plan that remains the predominant
and constituent element of the Cuban economy. Under the conditions outlined above, it can be sup-
posed that Partymembers continue to stay away from the trabajo por cuenta propia. Also, because Party
member is confronted with formal and informal control more than other persons who are not involved
in the Party. In Cuba, a Party member has to be accountable to compañeros for his or her public and
private life by displaying appropriate political and personal behavior. In other words, PCC’s members
must set good examples to colleagues, neighbors, friends and family with regard to adherence to social-
ist ideals. In their efforts to meet the socialist ideals (including leading an honest and simple life), Party
members observe and evaluate each other. Moreover, they are subject to monitoring and evaluation by
superiors.
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In general, Partymembers arenot randomlydistributed amongoccupations: they tend tobeoverrep-
resented among professional and technical occupations (Szelényi, 1987; Domínguez, 1978; Hernández,
2014). Accordingly, it is likely that a great part of Party members, even if they were eventually interested
in entering the private sector, found formal and informal restrictions to do so. As written in the in-
troduction, the Cuban government established formal restrictions for professionals and technicians on
changing jobs. These restrictions concerning changing jobs get stronger for Party members as the Party
tracks the professional careers of its affiliates. In fact, every Party cell is linked to a given workplace and
when changing jobs, Party members need to obtain an authorization, in the form of an introduction
letter and evaluation of career records, from the current Party cell, as well as receive an acceptance letter
from the receiving cell. The option of abandoning the Party in order to elude these controls also is not
quite viable. Although during the last years the exit procedure became more flexible, individual’s moti-
vations that generally are considered as reasonable to avoid the application of negative political record
are the following: retirement, health problems, being a fully care giver for a relative, and more recently,
long job contracts abroad. Finally, until now there are not indications that Party membership, ceteris
paribus, provides additional wealth (Romanò, 2012).
Taking all these arguments into account, the first hypothesis is:
Due to the Party’s concern for the effect of the reforms, Party members are less likely to
become cuentapropista than non-members.
Opportunities formobility canbe a functionof social resources—mainly information and influence
— that are embedded in and mobilized from one’s social networks. As discussed previously, social mo-
bility studies carried out in reforming and post socialist societies indicate that individuals turn to strong
ties to successfully complete the job searching. Strong ties secure influence from authorities, an asset
that in socialist societies is more difficult to obtain than just information. The “strength of strong ties”
argument (Bian, 2002) is consistent with the so-called “sociolismo” culture existing in Cuba. Sociolismo
is a popular pun that Cubans use to indicate the common practice of obtaining support from socios (a
Cuban term almost equivalent to “associates” or “friends”). Socios are those personal close contacts to
whom an individual turns when needing help. These socios represent both a trustworthy source of infor-
mation and a useful gatekeeper to reach reliable providers of items that are in short supply. People often
mobilize socios when trying to bend institutional and formal rules, but sometimes they activate them
even just to expedite or ensure the attainment of desirable legal items. Cubans generally acquire socios
by attending institutional contexts, such as school, workplace and neighborhood. In other words, in
Cuba “instrumental” mating often stems frommeeting in institutional contexts, generating strong ties.
Therefore, socios are useful sources of trustworthy information and, at the same time, willing providers
of references or influence from authorities. As discussed previously, official statements insist in present-
ing cuentapropismo sector as a gray area of the Cuban economy because it is considered as potentially in
conflict with socialist values. Municipal officials who are entitled to concede or deny licenses to potential
cuentapropista enjoy discretionary power (Ritter & Henken, 2014). Accordingly, the licensing process
is uncertain and license applications are often refused. The successful rate of applicants for licenses vary
over the years, but it rarely passes 50% (Ritter &Henken, 2014). Moreover, candidates who apply for a
business license as self-employee are screened with regard to their social conducts, especially candidates
to develop a business in front-office with foreigners. License applicants for business in front office with
foreigners receive a deeper screening process for two interrelated main reasons. First, Cuban authorities
consider the security of tourists as a valuable asset for the national tourist industry. Second, services
provided by small private businesses to foreigners can affect Cuba’s image abroad.
Taking all these arguments into account, the influence from authorities secured by strong ties could
be a greater advantage for the attainment of business licenses. Thus, the second hypothesis is:
Consistent with the strength of the strong ties argument, and taking the ambivalent status
conferred to self-employment into account, other things being equal, an individual who
turns to strong ties in his or her business license application is more likely to become a cuen-
tapropista.
Finally, the present study explores whether receiving remittances favors entrepreneurship in Cuba
too. As in Cuba self-employment is restricted to low-tech activities, the bulk of activities that could
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be carried out by cuentapropistas does not require considerable monetary investments. However, run-
ning businesses for foreigners, namely the most profitable businesses, implies that some international
standards are reached in order to offer attractive services and goods, e.g. repairing and adorning places,
providing air-conditioners. Goods and inputs that allow reaching international standards generally are
imported and highly taxed. Consequently, they are expensive with respect to Cuban average incomes.
Accordingly, individuals who can rely on remittances, i.e. additional incomes in hard currency, can be
favored compared to individuals that cannot. Therefore, the third hypothesis expectation is that:
As remittances are source of additional incomes in hard currency, other things being equal,
an individual who receives remittances is more likely to become a cuentapropista, at least for
those activities that require some monetary investments.
5 The Survey
5.1 Sampling Design
The hypotheses were tested using data collected in Havana between May 2010 and January 2011, that
is, at the end of the adjustments of the 2000s, implemented to mitigate the social effects of the market-
oriented reforms of the 1990s, and immediately before the onset of the more recent set of liberalizing
reforms approved by the VI Party Congress, held on April 2011. Accordingly, results from this study
provide a useful benchmark for future researches investigating the consequences of more recent liberal-
izations in Cuba. In the conclusion section, results from this study will be discussed in terms of their
generalizability for the period following the VI Party Congress.
To survey Cuban population, scholars need a formal authorization from the Central Committee of
the Cuban Communist Party. Such authorization is hardly ever granted to Cuban scholars and never
to foreign scholars. By virtue of the collaboration with the Department of Sociology of the University
of Havana, the CubanMinistry of Education authorized this survey study under the condition that the
data were collected by Cuban interviewers only. Interviews were held face to face by Cuban students
trained by the author in collaboration with professors of the Department of Sociology. The response
ratewas 87 per cent. The questionnaire consisted of questions concerning personal characteristics, social
relationships, memberships to professional associations or political organizations, socio-demographic
characteristics and wealth. Due to formal restrictions, no sampling frame was available. Accordingly,
the sample was designed to ensure that the data included enough observations from individuals work-
ing as state-employees and cuentapropistas, in order to obtain the required statistical power to test the
hypotheses. In the absence of a sampling frame, interviewers were assigned to the various districts ofHa-
bana, and instructed to randomly contact an approximately equal number of respondents from the two
worker groups, respecting quotas of themain demographic variables (i.e., gender, race). All respondents
were interviewed at home in order to protect their privacy, and selected on a geographical base. Intervie-
wees were assured about data confidentiality, independence from the government, and scientific scope
of the research.
The dataset consists of two groups. The first group (n = 92) consists of cuentapropistaswith a regular
license to work in the tourist sector in hard currency. All respondents are arrendadores for tourists,
i.e. owners of bed and breakfast who are licensed to sell their services in Cuban dollars. The choice
to focus on arrendadores was made in order to reduce the screening costs (Sudman, Sirken & Cowan,
1988): I focused on respondents from a segment of the population that carry out a trabajo por cuenta
propia that is profitable and desirablewith certainty. Almost all of cuentapropistas in the subsample were
state-employees before to become self-employed workers, while 3% had a previous private business and
16% declared that they were unemployed before starting their private business. Previous occupations
of the cuentapropistas that leave state-employment to engage in the private sector were: managers (5%
of the subsample), professionals (13%), technicians (21%), office workers (17%), service workers (16%),
blue-collar (8%).
The second group includes state-employees in traditional sectors, for example, teachers, technicians,
office workers, medics, librarians, soldiers (n = 136). In this second group of workers, professionals are
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over-represented (they are 36% of the sub-sample), while the remaining workers are: technicians (23%
of the subsample), soldiers (6% of the sub-sample) and semi-skilled or unskilled workers (blue-collar or
service workers).
Previous studies found that Party members own houses of higher standard than other workers
(Szelényi, 1983; Szelényi & Kostello, 1998; Walder, 1995). Therefore, the fact that the group of cuen-
tapropistas is mainly composed of owners of bed and breakfast introduces a conservative bias for the
test of hypothesis 1. Bed and breakfast’s owners develop their business at home. Consequently, the
characteristics of their house (number of rooms, place, etc.) are a crucial factor to develop this kind of
business. Another conservative bias was introduced by excluding the administrators of state-owned
enterprises who accounted for 6% of the original subsample of state-workers.
Party members represent the twenty-three per cent of the whole sample (members of the Youth
Communist Union, whose Cuban acronym is UJC, were considered as Party members). In 1997, Party
members were 780,000 nationally (Domínguez, 2002). Likewise, according to Hernández (2014), PCC
members in 2012 reached the figure of 769,318 and theUJC reached the figure of 405,830members. Con-
sidering that in 2010, the Cuban working-age population was about 6.8 million (see statistics on work-
force and salaries released by the Oficina Nacional de Estadistica e Información), Party members are
slightly over-represented (+4%) in the total sample.
In the total sample, the distribution of demographic variables, such as race and sex, is consistentwith
the general distribution among Havana residents; women are slightly overrepresented both among em-
ployees in traditional sectors and self-employedworkers. The overrepresentation of women is greater in
the subsampleof cuentapropistas than in state-employees subsample, becausebed andbreakfasts aremost
often managed by women. The age distribution of the subsample of state-employees reflects quite well
the age distribution in the state-workers population. Whereas, the age composition of the cuentapropis-
tas in the subsample reflects the general population of self-employed workers. In fact, the subsample of
cuentapropistas includes: 8,4% of respondents aged between 18-34; 37,9% aged 35-49 and 53,7% aged over
50. According to previous study focusing on the cuentapropista population, most entrepreneurs are 60
years old or older (32% of the men and 48% of the women) and the younger age categories have lower
frequencies (Pèrez Izquierdo, Oberto Calderòn, & Gonzalez Rodriguez, 2008, p.116).
5.2 Measures
Dependent variable. The dependent variable is operationalized as a dummy taking value 1 if the respon-
dent is a cuentapropista, whereas the reference category consists of workers in state-owner enterprises.
Independent Variables. Membership of the Cuban Communist Party or the Youth Communist
Union (cf. H1) is operationalized as dummy variable (Party affiliation: yes = 1; 21% of the sample is
affiliated to the Party). The data lack information on the number of years since an individual joined the
Party. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that a respondent joined the Party after attaining the current
position, but this possibility is unlikely. Party membership must be sought out and becoming a Party
member is hard and requires time.5 People who apply to become PCC’s members are screened with re-
gard to their political record, but also their private life, family background, job discipline or educational
career, their activism in institutional associations (e.g. FederationofCubanWomen) andparticipation in
neighborhood activities, such as, for example, the Committee for theDefense of theRevolution (CDR).
The waiting period can take two years and not all those who apply are granted membership. Further-
more, efforts to meet the Party standards continue also after one has obtained the full membership.
These efforts generally include constant and active participation in political meetings, in social activities
(e.g. voluntary work at own neighborhood and/or work unit), cooperation with Party officials, and so
on. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that individuals who run remunerative business would see
too fewbenefits and toomany costs in attempting to become aPartymember. This is all themore true as
in general Party membership does not secure additional material advantages (Romanò, 2012). Similarly,
it cannot be excluded that a respondent left the Party after attaining the current position. However, as
described previously, a member who applies to leave the Party must explain the motivations for such
5. Same rules are applied to UJC candidates. People under 30 years old can apply for the UJC, whereas Party membership can
be sought only after turning 34.
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a decision and his or her motivations must be reasonably grounded to avoid a negative political record.
Therefore, this possibility is quite unlikely.
The nature of personal contact who helped the respondent to obtain his or her current job (H2) is
operationalized using a dummy variable (strong tie: yes = 1; 35% of the respondents declared that he
or she mobilized a strong tie). Personal contacts who are coded as strong ties include the respondent’s
parents, siblings, other relatives and close friends. The reference category consists of respondents who
obtained their current job through acquaintance or institutional channels.
Receiving remittances (H3) is operationalized using a dummy variable (yes = 1; 19% of the respon-
dents declared that they receive remittances).
Control variables. The statistical models include control dummy variables for female (yes = 1; 64% of
the respondents are female), skin color (white: yes = 1; 63% of the respondents are white people), educa-
tion (degree = 1; 44%of the respondents hold a university degree, 39% in the cuentapropistas subsample),
whether one of the respondent’s parents holds a university degree (parental education: yes = 1; 31% of
the respondents are from better-educated families). Respondent’s age (M = 45; SD = 15) is centered on
18 years.
6 Results
Table 1 presents the results of two logistic regression models predicting being a cuentapropista (the refer-
ence category is state-employee in the so-called traditional sectors). Results from logistic regressions are
reported as odds ratio. Odds-ratios do not require a logarithmic transformation (Field, 2009, pp. 270–
271), therefore they are easier to understand than b coefficients. The models compare the odds ratio of
becoming a cuentapropista versus an employee in a state-owned enterprise of traditional sectors. Model
1 only includes control variables. Model 2 includes also the three independent variables referring to the
hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.
Table 1. Logistic Regressions Models Predicting Being a Cuentapropista
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Variables
Model 1
O.R.
Model 2
O.R.
Sex 0.83
(0.274)
0.80
(0.273)
Age 1.08***
(0.014)
1.09***
(0.015)
White 1.16
(0.373)
1.08
(0.356)
University degree 0.57
(0.180)
0.64
(0.212)
Family background 1.78
(0.654)
1.91
(0.740)
Remittances 2.44*
(0.992)
Strong ties 1.07
(0.363)
Party membership 0.43*
(0.182)
Observations 228 228
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Model 2 indicates that, controlling for education, sex and the other variables, Party membership is
negatively associated with being a cuentapropista. The odds of becoming a cuentapropista is 57% lower
(OR = 0.43, p < 0.05) for a Party member than for a non-member. Therefore, H1 is supported as being
a Party member reduces the chances of entering the private sector. In other words, this result suggests
that Party members do not spend or convert their political capital to develop a business in the private
sector.
Concerning the strength of strong ties argument (H2), Model 2 indicates that strong ties by them-
selves do not affect the likelihood of becoming a cuentapropista. In fact, the odds ratio is 1.07 but not
significant. However, the non-significant odds ratio for strong ties in Model 2 does not imply that in
Cuba turning to strong ties is useless to attain a job. This non-significant effect just indicates that approx-
imately the same percentage of individuals in both groups obtained their current position — whether
as state employee or not — through strong ties. Specifically, about 36% of individuals in the sample,
independently of their attained position, obtained their job mobilizing close friends, parents or other
relatives. More generally, about 50% of the subjects reported that they turned to personal contacts
(weak or strong) to obtain their current job position. Thus, these data seem to confirm that in Cuba
it is quite a common practice to use personal ties, especially if strong, in order to obtain a job position.
These results are consistent with the strength of strong ties’ argument elaborated by Bian (Bian &Ang,
1997; Bian, 2002) and with research findings of studies on the Cuban labor market (Echevarría, Díaz &
Romero, 2014). State-employees who did not turn to personal contacts declared that they used institu-
tional channels to obtain the position they held at the moment of the interview. In particular, 28% of
state-employees declared that they used services provided by a state-agency (most of them have main-
tained the job in the same state-owned enterprises or institutions where they carried out the training
period after the graduation); 15% declared that they sent a spontaneous application; and 6% declared
that they knew about the vacancy through a public announcement. In the cuentapropistas group, indi-
viduals who did not turn to personal contacts declared that they obtained the license relying on own
personal initiative (32%), or exploiting available institutional information (16%).
Receiving remittances increases the odds of becoming cuentapropista. The reason for which the odd
ratio of receiving remittances is positively and strongly associated with the chances of becoming a cuen-
tapropista is trivial: remittances are in hard currency. In other words, recipients of remittances hold an
additional source of income that they can use for developing a private business. However, this result
should be cautiously generalized. In the sample there are cuentapropistas who are owners of bed and
breakfasts, i.e. profitable businesses that require some monetary investments in order to reach the inter-
national standards. However, the bulk of activities that can be carry out by self-employed workers do
not require large monetary investments. Accordingly, it is possible that the role of remittances is less
significant for those self-employed workers who run activities not directed to foreigners.
Among control variables, a significant effect is found for age as the odds ratio shows a positive and
strong association with the chance of becoming a cuentapropista. This result suggest that licenses poli-
cies favor older people, especially people who are near retirement age. The distribution of age among
cuentapropistas in the sample shows that the age in the third quartile ranges from 52 to 65 years, while the
upper quartile is composed of individuals older than 65 years. This result appears consistentwith official
statements presenting the cuentapropismo sector as a residual area of theCuban economy created, among
other things, to offer income opportunities to those categories with reduced ability to work (i.e. retirees
or older people), who were most deeply affected by the crisis. On the contrary, the Cuban government
expects that young and educated people engage and contribute to the Cuban economy that remains
planned and presided over by state-owned enterprises.
7 Conclusions
The present study focuses on returns of Party affiliation and mobilization of personal contacts on the
chances to enter the cuentapropismo sector. Moreover, it explores the role of remittances in favoring the
opportunity to run a private business. Cuentapropismo emerged as a result of market-oriented reforms
implemented in the 1990s in order to recover the Cuban economy after the exogenous shock of the col-
lapse of the Soviet Bloc. Accordingly, the enactment of reforms aiming at the expansion of the non-state
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sector was characterized by a stop/go trend formore than two decades. Thus, for example, the non-state
sector and in particular the cuentapropismo shrank during the 2000s. Although the popular belief holds
that theCubanCommunist Partymaintains political consensus by rewarding its ownmembers, research
findings from the present study suggest that being a Party members is negatively associated with entry
in the private sector operating in hard currency, which generally offers remunerative job-positions. This
result, however, can be understood in light of the nature and pace of Cuban market-oriented reforms,
that were rather cautious. Moreover, it is consistent with the results of previous studies that focused
on the effects of political credentials on entry in the private sector in state-reforming socialism. In fact,
scholars generally agree that Party members start to engage in the private sector only after the market
becomes legitimate as principle. Concerning the use of social networks in the labormarket, results from
this study suggest that turning to personal contacts to obtain a job in both state and non-state sectors
is a common practice in Cuba. Thirty-five percent of Cubans in the sample turned to strong ties, while
about 15% turned to weak ties. Therefore this study provides further support to previous research find-
ings. However, according to my results, the mobilization of strong ties does not secure an advantage
for the entry in the private sector. In Cuba strong ties represent an asset for successfully completing the
job attainment though not necessarily leading to upward mobility. In addition, as efficaciously pointed
out by the popular pun “sociolismo,” the mobilization of strong ties to attain jobs is a practice prone to
undermine Cuba’s equality-based policies.
As anticipated, the novelty of this study consists mainly in filling a gap in the literature about the
Cuban case. In fact, both factors—political credentials andmobilization of networks resources—have
been extensively studied by social mobility studies carried out in reforming and post socialist economies,
but they remained poorly documented in the literature on Cuba. Moreover, this study innovates by
empirically exploring both issues using survey data, and it’s a first attempt to overcome the absence of
individual-level data on inequality in Cuba, due to the formal and informal constraints regulating sur-
veys.
I hope that these initial findings on network effects and rewards accorded to political credentials will
entice future research on socialmobility in order to shed further light on themechanisms responsible for
inequality in Cuba and on the relation between inequality and dynamics of institutional change. The
results from this study should be generalized cautiously given the characteristics of the sampling design
(including only workers from Havana). The data were collected immediately before the approval of
the Guidelines of Economic and Social Policy and the subsequent market reforms. These guidelines
include a set of measures intended to expand the private sector, for example: a) the further enlargement
of the list of jobs that can carried out by self-employedworkers; b) the de-penalization of labor in private
micro-enterprises; c) the institution of banking loans for physical persons and private enterprises; and
(f) the reduction of workplaces in state enterprises. Moreover, these more recent reforms have been
accompanied by public statements presenting them as permanent measures, intended to update the
Cuban socialist model. In other words, official statements have begun to present the private sector as
complementary to the planned Cuban economy. Under these new circumstances, future research may
reveal that Party members begin to penetrate the private sector. Accordingly, the present study could
be used to test the claim that party members start to engage in the private sector only after market, as an
integration mechanism, becomes legitimized.
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